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BARBARA J. MOTES, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant/ : 
Petitioner, : 
v. : 
PRESTON J. MOTES, : Case No. 8800315-CA 
: District Court No. D86-1615 
Defendant/Respondent/ 
Cross Appellant : Priority No. 14(b) 
00O00 
APPELLANTS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Appellant/Petitioner, Barbara J. Motes, through her 
counsel on appeal Kent M. Kasting, Esq., of Dart, Adamson & 
Kasting, petitions this Court pursuant to Riile 3 5 of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals for a rehearing of the issues raised by 
Appellant on appeal based upon the reasons set forth below. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND CERTIFICATION 
This petition is based on the fact that this Court's opinion 
in the above matter overlooks and misapprehends several points of 
law and fact germane to the issues originally raised on appeal. 
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner hereby certifies that this 
Petition is brought in good faith and not for delay. 
POINT I 
THIS COURT MISUNDERSTOOD HOW THE TRIAL COURT 
DEALT WITH MRS. MOTES1 INHERITANCE AND ITS 
DICTA RELATIVE TO ITS REMAND SHOULD BE VACATED 
At the time of trial, most of Mrs. Motes' inheritance had been 
transferred by the parties to the parties' children in accounts set 
up specifically for the children (Tr. 38, 42 & 69). Mr. Motes 
claimed he was entitled to all of the appreciation on all of the 
inheritance. (Tr. 69 and Defendant's Exhibit 1.) 
In arriving at the overall property distribution, the trial 
court isolated and did not include in it either of the parties' 
retirement. Rather, it took the remaining property and awarded 
Mrs. Motes $87,707 in value and Mr. Motes $99,913 in value and then 
explained that the $12,206 difference in favor of Mr. Motes was to 
compensate him for his claim that his efforts increased the value 
of Mrs. Motes' inheritance (most of which had already been given 
to the children) . 
Nowhere in the findings or record is there a suggestion that 
the deferral of the retirement funds distribution was related to 
and based upon the overall property distribution. Therefore, the 
dicta contained in the last paragraph of page 4 of the Motes 
opinion and the further comments contained in footnote 3 reflect 
a misunderstanding of the facts by this Court and give the 
implication that an entire new trial is necessary on all of the 
property issues vis a vis Mr. Motes' entitlement to compensation 
for his alleged "investment services" when it is clear from the 
record that the trial court considered those services. 
2 
The remedy fashioned by the trial court related to the 
property division was not "inextricably linked" to the trial 
court's deferral of a decision on the distribution of the 
retirement plans. At best, the retirement income deferral issue 
was related to the trial court's award of child support and a 
remand of this case should not, even by inference, suggest an 
entire new trial on all property and support issues. Rather, the 
remand should be for the purposes of determining what child support 
Mr. Motes should have been paying, after considering his actual 
income and his imputed income based upon a full utilization of his 
skills and talents and a determination of what he would then owe 
Mrs. Motes for using all of the retirement income while this appeal 
has been pending. 
The mere passage of substantial amounts of time between the 
trial court's distribution of property and this Court's decision 
makes the suggestion that new trial be held on all issues 
impossible, as a practical matter, given changes in financial 
positions of the parties, and fluctuations in asset values which 
have occurred since trial. 
The original property distribution was clearly within the 
discretion of the trial court. Simply because it did not include 
two assets of the marriage (capable of now being separately divided 
very easily) should not be the basis of an entire new trial as now 
has been suggested in the opinion. 
This Court's opinion should be modified with instructions to 
the trial court to divide the pension plans consistent with this 
3 
Court's holding in Greene v. Greene. 751 P. 2d 827, 830-31 (Utah 
App. 1988), and to then fix an appropriate award of child support 
based upon the parties' respective earnings and capacities to earn. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT "S DECISION ON THE INCOME TAX 
EXEMPTION ISSUE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
DECISIONS OF MARTINEZ V, MARTINEZ. 754 P. 2d 69 
(Utah App. 1988) cert, granted 765 P.2d 1277 
(Utah 1988) and FULMER V. FUIMER, 761 P. 2d 942 
(Utah App. 1988) AND AS SUCH CREATES CONFUSION 
AND UNCERTAINTY FOR TRIAL COURTS AND LITIGANTS 
While the parties did not consider the income tax exemption 
issue to be two major issues related to this appeal, this Court 
evidently felt otherwise and has now concluded that trial courts 
in Utah have the discretion to allocate income tax exemptions in 
divorce actions. In so doing, this Court erroneously attempted to 
distinguish the Motes case from this Court's previous decisions in 
Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P. 2d 69 (Utah App. 1988) cert, granted 
765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988) and Fulmer v. Fulmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah 
App. 1988) . Those cases are not distinguishable and are directly 
contrary to the Court's holding in Motes. 
In Martinez, the trial court specifically found and ordered 
the following: 
24. As a result of the substantial 
contribution by Defendant to the support and 
maintenance of the parties' children, it is 
fair and equitable that Defendant be awarded 
the two oldest children for tax deduction 
purposes, and that Plaintiff be directed to 
file the necessary documents in order to allow 
Defendant to claim them as deductions during 
each December starting 1985. Plaintiff should 
be awarded the deductions for the youngest 
child (R. 208-209). 
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Mrs. Martinez then appealed that portion of the order claiming 
that federal law awarding the custodial parent the tax exemptions 
in the absence of a waiver preempted the state court's power to 
allocate exemptions. 
The undersigned, as counsel on appeal for Dr. Martinez, 
responded and argued that a Utah trial court did have the 
discretion to allocate the exemptions. The portion of Dr. 
Martinez's brief dealing with that and considered by this Court is 
set forth below verbatim; 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOCATING THE 
INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS AS IT DID. 
A. 
SECTION 30-3-5, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) , GIVE THE 
TRIAL COURT THE POWER TO ALLOCATE INCOME TAX 
EXEMPTIONS IN ANY MANNER THAT IS FAIR AND 
EQUITABLE IN A DIVORCE ACTION. 
Appellant, in Point IV of her Brief, 
argues that because of a recent change in the 
federal tax laws, state courts no longer have 
the power or right to allocate dependency 
exemptions in divorce actions. Appellant's 
argument that the Internal Revenue Code now 
preempts the ability of a state court to 
control this important property right of the 
parties, present in every divorce case, whether 
contested or uncontested, provides a simple but 
an incorrect analysis of the law. 
First, the Internal Revenue Code 
provisions are silent as to whether a state 
court has or does not have the power to 
allocate the exemptions. In the absence of a 
specific statutory prohibition, principles of 
statutory construction require that prohibited 
functions cannot be inferred from the general 
language of the statute. If there is no 
specific prohibition, then the function is 
allowable and not in violation of the statute. 
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See, 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes Section 210. The 
new tax law makes no mention of a prohibition 
of a state court from allocating exemptions. 
Second, Appellant's argument, if accepted, 
would give every custodial parent an 
"inalienable" right to claim the exemptions 
unless he or she voluntarily gave them to the 
non-custodial parent. It would insulate the 
custodial parent from any judicial review of 
the equitable effect of having or not having 
the exemptions. Certainly, that was not the 
intent of Congress in passing the 1984 
Amendments. A better explanation of those 
changes is that they were intended to apply in 
cases where the parties voluntarily agree that 
the non-custodial parent may claim the 
exemptions, or where the non-custodial parent 
does not care to be awarded the exemptions. 
However, in divorce cases where the award 
of dependency exemption is a contested issue, 
it becomes the job of the state courts to award 
those exemptions on an equitable basis after 
considering the income and tax rates of the 
parties, the amount of support to be paid, and 
the financial impact of any such award on both 
of the parties. 
The authority of the Utah courts to deal 
with income tax exemptions is found in Section 
30-3-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) , which 
provides in relevant part: 
(1) When a decree of divorce is 
rendered, the court may include in 
it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property and parties. Id. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This statute allows income tax exemptions to 
be dealt with by the divorce court in at least 
three ways. First, because an exemption can 
be worth over $600.00 to a taxpayer in the 50% 
bracket, it becomes an important property right 
which is integrally related to any child 
support award. Second, because it may have an 
effect on the child support award, it 
indirectly affects the children and the monies 
they receive. Third, the court may make orders 
relative to the parties and direct them to do 
or refrain from doing certain things, including 
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the execution of documents to achieve an 
equitable resolution of the issues in a divorce 
action. 
In this case, the court made the following 
Finding of Fact on the exemption issue. 
24. As a result of the 
substantial contribution by Defendant 
to the support and maintenance of the 
parties1 children, it is fair and 
equitable that Defendant be awarded 
the two oldest children for tax 
deduction purposes, and that 
Plaintiff be directed to file the 
necessary documents in order to allow 
Defendant to claim them as deductions 
during each December starting 1985. 
Plaintiff should be awarded the 
deductions for the youngest child. 
(R. 208-209) 
As can be seen, the court considered the 
amount of support the Defendant was to pay in 
reaching what is considered to be an equitable 
allocation of the exemptions and ""it then 
directed the Plaintiff to execute the documents 
necessary to effectuate this equitable 
allocation. The federal statutes in no way 
prohibit the court from doing what it did. To 
do so would necessarily result in substantial 
and serious inequities in divorce actions 
throughout the country. 
Even assuming that the federal statutes 
could be read in such a away as to preclude a 
state court from allocating exemptions in 
divorce actions per se, they certainly cannot 
be read to also preclude the court from 
ordering a party to allow the non-custodial 
parent to claim the exemption. This is an 
inherent power of the divorce court absolutely 
necessary to achieve a full, complete and fair 
resolution of the financial issues always 
involved in divorce actions where qhildren are 
involved. 
Because the 1984 amendment to Section 
152(e) did not eliminate the ability of the 
state court to allocate the dependency 
deduction, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion or violate the supremacy clause of 
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the U.S. Constitution in awarding the Defendant 
two of the three children for purposes of 
federal and state tax deductions. 
(Respondent's Brief p. 42-45 Martinez v. 
Martinez, supra). 
The above argument was rejected by the Martinez court and 
certiorari on that particular issue was then refused by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
Martinez holds there is no power to allocate exemptions and 
Motes now holds that there is that power and in so doing places the 
writer of this Brief in the unenviable position of being able to 
say he argued in Martinez that the power to allocate exemptions 
existed and lost and later argued in Motes that the power to 
allocate exemptions did not exist and lost. 
Likewise, in Motes, this Court has now concluded the trial 
court has the discretion to allocate exemptions whereas in Fulmer 
v. Fulmer, 751 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988), Judge Billings writing 
for herself and Judges Greenwood and Garff stated: 
Our decision today maintains appellant as 
Dagin's custodial parent. Appellant has not 
signed a written waiver allowing respondent to 
claim the exemption. Thus under Section 
152(e), appellant, as the custodial parent, is 
entitled to the exemption. 
Although many state courts interpreting the 
predecessor provisions to section 152(e) have 
determined that they have discretion to award 
the exemption in a divorce proceeding, see 
generally, Davis v. Fair, 707 S.W.2d 711, 717 
(Tex. Ct. App. 198 6) (and cases cited therein) , 
we agree with the courts that have concluded 
they do not have the authority to grant the 
exemption contrary to the provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 718. See also 
Lorenz v. Lorenz, 166 Mich. App. 58, 419 N.W.2d 
770 (Mich. App. 1988); Valento v. Valento, 385 
N.W.2d 860 (Minn.App. 1986). Accordingly, we 
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reverse the trial court's award of the 
exemption to respondent. 
Id. at 950 (Emphasis added.) 
From the foregoing, it is clearly apparent that this Court's 
holding in Motes is directly contrary to the holdings of Martinez 
and Fulmer. The principles of stare decisis how require this Court 
to reverse its decision in Motes on the tax exemption issue or in 
the alternative, the overrule its decisions in Martinez and Fulmer. 
Parenthetically, it is also important to note that Section 
78-45-2 et seq., Utah Code Ann, dealing with Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines was evidently based on calculations which included 
granting the exemptions to the custodial parent in determining 
support awards under the guidelines and, therefore, this Court's 
holding in Motes, necessarily makes the fixed child support amounts 
under the guidelines subject to challenge and invalidation. 
To ignore this inconsistency creates uncertainty and confusion 
for trial courts and litigants alike and results in a total absence 
of guidance as to what the state of the law is relative to 
allocation of tax exemptions in divorce actions. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT'S DECISION NOT TO AWARD MRS. MOTES 
HER ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL EFFECTIVELY 
PRECLUDES HER FROM FURTHER LITIGATION OF HER 
CASE. 
Even though Mrs. Motes' request for attorney's fees on appeal 
was thoroughly briefed and supported by valid authority, this Court 
summarily addressed that issue by stating: 
The parties shall bear their own costs and 
attorney's fees on appeal (Motes v. Motes, Case 
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No. 880015-CA, filed November 16, 1989). 
Mrs. Motes does not have the financial resources to pay the 
attorneyfs fees she incurred in connection with securing a reversal 
of Judge Rigtrup's decision related to the handling of the parties1 
respective retirement funds. She is substantially indebted to her 
appellate counsel and by no means has the resources to pursue what 
amounts to a new trial on the property issues at the district court 
level. 
Mrs. Motes was the successful party on appeal. She was 
required to bring the error of the trial court to this Court's 
attention and consequently should be awarded the fees which she 
incurred on the original appeal as well as the fees she has now 
incurred in connection with the filing of this Petition for 
Rehearing. 
This Court has always been willing to award a spouse fees on 
appeal when that spouse is required to defend an appeal which is 
found to be without merit. (See Mauqhn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156, 
162 (Utah App. 1989)). Likewise, where a spouse is required to 
appeal an action of the trial court which is clearly erroneous and 
then secures a reversal an award of attorney's fees on appeal is 
also appropriate (See Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331, 1337 (Utah 
App. 1987)). 
Fees on appeal should be awarded Mrs. Motes and the matter 
remanded for a factual determination of her need and the amount of 
fees she incurred on appeal consistent with the procedure set out 
in Rasband supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
The original property distribution was clearly within the 
discretion of the trial court and considered any efforts Mr. Motes 
claimed to have expended in connection with appreciation 
attributable to Mrs. Motes1 inheritance. The remedy fashioned by 
the trial court related to the property division was not 
inextricably linked to the trial court's decision on the 
distribution of the retirement plans. As such this Court's opinion 
should be modified with instructions to the trial court to divide 
the pension plans consistent with the holdibg in Greene, supra., 
and to then fix an appropriate award of child support based on the 
parties' respective earnings and capacities to earn. 
This Court's decision on the income tax exemption issue is 
inconsistent with the Martinez v. Martinez, supra., in Fulmer v. 
Fulmer, supra. and as such, creates confusion and uncertainty for 
trail courts and litigants. The principal of stare decisis require 
this Court to reverse its decision in this case so as to be 
consistent with the holdings of Martinez and Fulmer. 
Mrs. Motes was the successful party on appeal. She was 
required to bring the error of the trial court to this Court's 
attention and, consequently, should be awarded the fees which she 
has incurred on the original appeal as well as the fees she has now 
incurred in connection with the filing of this Petition for 
Rehearing. 
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Respectfully submitted this 29th day of November, 1989. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
Cent Mo Kastii 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Aj 
Petitioner 
11ant/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify I caused four true and correct copies of the 
Petition for Rehearing to be hand-delivered to the following 
counsel of record on the 29th day of November, 1989: 
David S. Dolowitz 
Cohen, Rapport & Segal 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Court of Appeals OPINION 1-13 
Motes v. Motes, Court of Appeals No. 88001^ 
File November 16, 1989 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Barbara J. Motes, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, and 
Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Preston J. Motes, 
Defendant, Respondent, and 
Cross-Appellant. 
6PINION 
(For publication) 
Case fte.- 880015-CA 
F I L E D 
r^Uryh Noe-'n 
Third District, Salt Lake County d!fc<^ fth* 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup u*hcourts* 
Attorneys: Kent M. Kasting, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
David S. Dolowitz and Julie A. Bryan, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orra^. 
ORME, Judge: 
Plaintiff Barbara Motes appeals from the the trial court's 
entry of a divorce decree, claiming the court erred in 
postponing the apportionment of defendant Preston Motes's 
military retirement fund. Plaintiff also challenges the 
court's power to order her to execute the forms necessary for 
defendant to claim the federal tax dependency exemption for one 
of their children whose custody was awarded to plaintiff. This 
issue is the primary focus of our opinion. Defendant's 
cross-appeal concerns the profits generated during the marriage 
through his investment and management of plaintiff's 
inheritance. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand 
for further proceedings. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1967. At that 
time, defendant was three years into his career as a military 
officer and plaintiff was a nurse. During the marriage, 
defendant obtained a Masters of Business Administration degree 
from the University of Utah, and plaintiff secured a Bachelor 
of Science degree in nursing. At the time this action was 
filed, defendant had retired from the military and was working 
as a financial planner, and plaintiff was working as a nursing 
supervisor and attempting to obtain her Master's degree in 
nursing. Defendant claimed he suffered a net loss each month 
from his financial planning work. Plaintiff earned a monthly 
net income of approximately $1700. 
At trial, the parties stipulated to the division of a large 
part of the marital property, leaving disputes primarily as to 
the division of defendant's military retirement benefits, which 
were generating payments of approximately $1500 per month; 
plaintiff's retirement fund, which held approximately $5100; 
and plaintiff's substantial inheritance and the additional 
funds generated through investment and growth of the 
inheritance proceeds. 
Following trial, at which plaintiff represented herself, 
plaintiff was awarded custody of the children. The court 
awarded defendant the right to receive the full amount of his 
military retirement during the period in which he was to pay 
child support. The court reasoned that, absent this income, 
defendant would be unable to meet his child support 
obligations, which the court had set based on defendant 
receiving the full amount of his monthly retirement benefits. 
The court determined that the final disposition of both 
parties' retirement accounts would be settled when defendant's 
child support obligations ceased, some five years hence. 
Plaintiff was awarded the full amount of her inheritance and 
the full amount of the investment income derived therefrom, and 
defendant was awarded the federal tax dependency exemption for 
one of the children. 
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred in 
awarding defendant the full amount of his monthly military 
retirement benefits, even though for the well-intentioned 
purpose of enabling defendant to satisfy his child support 
obligations. Plaintiff also contends the court exceeded its 
authority in ordering her to execute the documents necessary 
for defendant to claim the dependency exemption for one of the 
children on his federal tax return. Defendant cross-appeals, 
seeking a portion of those funds he claims to have generated by 
prudently investing plaintiff's inheritance.1. 
1. The record does not contain a satisfactory explanation as 
to why defendant's claimed financial prowess enabled him to so 
greatly enhance the value of plaintiff's inheritance while his 
professional investment activities are so unsuccessful that his 
expenses exceed his commissions. 
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I. 
RETIREMENT INCOME AND INVESTMENT PROCEEDS 
FROM INHERITANCE 
The interest in a retirement plan accrued during marriage 
is considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution 
upon divorce. See, £^g.# Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 
1078-79 (Utah 1988); Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432 
(Utah 1982); Doau v. Poem. 652 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Utah 1982); 
Greene v. Greene. 751 P.2d 827, 830-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Maxwell v. Maxwell. 754 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Bailev v. Bailev. 745 P.2d 830, 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
Marchant v. Marchant. 743 P.2d 199, 204-05 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). The best method for distributing or allocating 
retirement benefits or their value depends on the particular 
circumstances, see Gardner. 748 P.2d at 1079, but where 
possible the purpose to advance is that of "end[ing] marriage 
and allow[ing] the parties to make as much of a clean break 
from each other as is reasonably possible." III. Obviously, 
postponing even a decision on ultimate distribution of both 
retirement plans for some five years is inimical to that goal. 
But see Ravburn v. Ravburn. 738 P.2d 238, 241-42 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (cash-out of one spouse's interest in retirement fund 
over five-year period was acceptable where total value of 
retirement was substantial and installment cash-out approach 
was only alternative to longer entanglement).2 Thus, as 
between decreeing a more immediate adjustment or simply 
deferring the other spouse-s participation until payments are 
eventually received, our Supreme Court has stated that the 
latter ••alternative should be employed only in rare 
instances.H Gardner. 748 P.2d at 1079. Such instances include 
cases "where other assets for equitable distribution are 
inadequate or lacking altogether, or where no present value can 
be established . . . .H I£. (quoting Kikkert v. Kikkert. 177 
N.J. Super. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76,. 79-80 (1981)). 
However, unlike all but one of the cases cited in the 
preceding paragraph, the instant case does not involve the 
difficult questions presented by retirement programs held by 
those still working, which will—or may—only eventually result 
in income. In the instant case, like in Qreene. one spouse had 
already retired and his retirement benefits had ripened into 
monthly payments, see 751 P.2d at 828, the present value of 
which could be readily ascertained. Treatment of such benefits 
2. The Ravburn-type treatment was endorsed in Gardner. See 
748 P.2d at 1079. 
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is less problematic than in the usual case. The present value 
of plaintiffs share of the now-fixed stream of income, which 
the benefits have become, can be readily calculated and 
compensated for with distribution of other assets having an 
equivalent value or cashed out over a comparatively short time. 
That failing, provision can simply be made for plaintiff to 
receive her share monthly, the approach taken in Greene. See 
751 P.2d at 827. 
Instead, the trial court in this case postponed the 
distribution of defendant's retirement benefits for the purpose 
of funding higher child support payments to plaintiff than would 
otherwise have been appropriate. But the net effect of such an 
approach is to fund defendant's support obligations through what 
amounts to an appropriation of plaintiff's property. It is no 
answer that the appropriation may be rescinded or ameliorated in 
five years. The retirement plans of both parties should have 
been treated as marital assets and definitively dealt with in 
the decree as part of an equitable property distribution between 
the parties. Accordingly, we reverse the court's treatment of 
both parties' retirement funds and remand for distribution in 
accordance with the foregoing. 
The collateral effect of our reversing the trial court's 
handling of the parties' retirement plans is that we must also 
remand for reconsideration the child support award and the 
disposition of proceeds generated through the investment of 
plaintiff's inheritance. From all that appears, the court's 
disposition of these items was inextricably linked with its 
decision to deprive plaintiff of participation in defendant's 
retirement fund for at least five years.3 
3. We do not suggest that it would necessarily be inappropriate 
to award defendant's share of the inheritance profits to 
plaintiff in exchange for retirement benefits to which she would 
otherwise be entitled. That may well be an element of an 
equitable overall distribution. See, e.g., Gardner, 748 P.2d at 
1079 (one "alternative would be reapportionment of the property 
distribution to offset the value of the retirement account"). 
But the court's findings do not establish that this is what the 
court did here, at least not with any precision. The general 
question of defendant's entitlement to some part of the growth 
of the inherited funds is governed by Mortensen v. Mortensen, 
760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). 
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II. 
FEDERAL TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTION 
The most significant question this case presents is whether 
a divorce court has the authority to award a tax exemption to 
the noncustodial parent by ordering the custodial parent to 
execute the necessary federal tax form. Two prior decisions of 
this court, Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), and Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct- App-), 
cert, granted- 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988), dealt generally with 
the question of dependent tax exemptions in the divorce 
context. However, neither involved an actual order that the 
forms be executed. Sfifi Fullmer. 761 P.2d at 949-50; Martinez, 
754 P.2d at 72- Thus, the precise issue is presented to us for 
the first time in this case. 
A. SECTION 152 
Prior to the 1985 tax year, section 152 of the Internal 
Revenue Code provided that a noncustodial parent was entitled to 
claim a dependency exemption in any tax year where that parent 
paid more than $1200 toward the child1s support, and the 
custodial parent -did not clearly establish that [the custodial 
parent] provided more support of such child - - - than the 
parent not having custody." This rule apparently created 
recurring headaches for the Internal Revenue Service. The usual 
scenario began with a noncustodial parent who had paid more than 
$1200 toward the child*s support, thus meeting the minimal 
threshold requirement under section 152. However, the parents 
were often in disagreement as to which of them had actually paid 
the majority of the child's support. It was apparently not 
uncommon for the dispute to be -resolved" by both parents 
claiming an exemption for the child on their respective tax 
returns. When this "double-dipping" was detected, the IRS was 
forced to audit both parents' returns and otherwise investigate 
to determine which one actually had paid the majority of the 
child's support and was therefore entitled to the dependency 
exemption. If nothing else, the situation amounted in an 
inefficient expenditure of effort by the IRS. 
In 1984, Congress accordingly amended section 152 to provide 
that the custodial parent is automatically entitled to the 
available dependency exemptions unless he or she "signs a 
written declaration . . . that such custodial parent will not 
claim such child as a dependant" and "the noncustodial parent 
attaches such written declaration to [his or her tax] 
return . . . ." 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(2) (1988). 
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The issue before us in this case is whether a state court 
may order the custodial parent to execute the required 
declaration allowing the noncustodial parent to claim the 
exemptions. We hold that state courts do retain their 
traditional authority to allocate dependency exemptions 
notwithstanding the 1984 amendment. Our conclusion is based on 
an analysis of Congress's intent in enacting the 1984 amendment; 
the lack of a provision explicitly divesting state courts of 
their consistently recognized pre-amendment authority to 
allocate exemptions; the significant majority of other 
jurisdictions holding that state courts retain such authority; 
and the impracticality and irrationality of a contrary ruling. 
B. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Prior to the 1984 amendment/ it was uniformly held that 
state courts had authority to allocate dependency exemptions in 
divorce cases.4 See, e.g.. Lincoln v. Lincoln, 155 Ariz. 272, 
746 P.2d 13, 16-17 (Ct. App. 1987); Lorenz v. Lorenz, 166 Mich. 
App. 58, 419 N.W.2d 770, 771 (1988); Fudenbero v. Molstad, 390 
N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 
449, 456 (W. Va. 1987). Thus, the amendment would have to be 
construed as a substantial departure from prior substantive law 
for one to conclude that state courts do not still have this 
power. This is an unreasonable construction of the amendment 
for two reasons. 
First, the amendment does not expressly divest state courts 
of their traditional power, "and this silence demonstrates 
Congress's surpassing indifference to how the exemption is 
allocated as long as the IRS doesn't have to do the 
allocating.- Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 457. Had Congress actually 
intended to terminate the established practice of state courts 
allocating exemptions, "it is more reasonable than not to infer 
that . . . Congress would have said so." Icl. at 458. See also 
In re Marriage of Einhorn, 178 111. App. 3d 212, 533 N.E.2d 29, 
37 (1988); Wassif v. Wassif. 77 Md. App. 750, 551 A.2d 935, 940 
(1989). 
Second, Congress did not intend such a result. The 1984 
amendment Hwas meant to address the desire of the IRS not to get 
involved in [disputes between parents over exemptions] where it 
4. The pre-amendment allocation was typically accomplished by 
a court order providing that the noncustodial parent be 
entitled to take the exemption if current in child support. 
The "current in child support" proviso was incorporated into 
the decree in this case as well, an entirely sensible condition. 
880015-CA 6 
had very little, if anything, to gain by the outcome." Wassif, 
551 A.2d at 939. The Congressional record supports that 
characterization of the amendment. 
The present rules governing the 
allocations of the dependency exemption 
are often subjective and present difficult 
problems of proof and substantiation. The 
Internal Revenue Service becomes involved 
in many disputes between parents who both 
claim the dependency exemption based on 
providing support over the applicable 
thresholds. The cost to the parties and 
the Government to resolve these disputes 
is relatively high and the Government 
generally has little tax revenue at stake 
in the outcome. The committee wishes to 
provide more certainty by allowing the 
custodial spouse the exemption unless that 
spouse waives his or her right to claim 
the exemption. Thus, dependency disputes 
between parents will be resolved without 
the involvement of the Internal Revenue 
Service. 
H.R. Rep. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II, reprinted in 
1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 697, 1140. Following the 
amendment, all the IRS need concern itself with when facing a 
noncustodial parent claiming an exemption is whether the 
custodial parent has executed the requisite declaration. See 
Einhorn, 533 N.E.2d at 37. The administrative ease of such a 
procedure is obvious, but it should be of no concern to the IRS 
if the declaration was executed entirely voluntarily, in 
accordance with a stipulated settlement, or pursuant to court 
order. The IRS is merely interested in the orderly 
administration of revenue collections, which is enhanced by 
doing away with the -majority of support" test. That test 
necessitated extensive audits by the IRS, while compliance with 
the signed declaration requirement can be ascertained most 
expediently. We arc net cited to, nor have we located, any 
authority indicating that Congress intended the 1984 amendment 
to divest state courts of their traditional authority and 
bestow a collateral economic benefit on custodial parents. Nor 
can we identify any legitimate policy reason for Congress to 
assert an interest in the division of what is tantamount to 
marital property, a task traditionally reserved under our 
federal system for each state's domestic relations courts. 
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In sum, the amendment was merely intended to enhance the 
administrative convenience of the IRS, not to interfere with 
state court prerogatives.5 See, e.g., Fudenberg v. Molstad. 
390 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); In re Marriage of 
Milesnick, 765 P.2d 751, 754 (Mont. 1988); Peroolski v. 
Pergolski, 143 Wise. 2d 166, 420 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Ct. App. 
1988). 
C. CASE AUTHORITY 
The vast majority of other jurisdictions to confront the 
issue have concluded that state courts retain the authority to 
order the custodial parent to execute the declaration 
contemplated by the 1984 amendment. 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1335 
(May 16, 1989); In re Marriage of Milesnick, 765 P.2d at 754. 
See Lincoln v. Lincoln, 155 Ariz. 272, 746 P.2d 13, 16-17 (Ct. 
App. 1987); In re Marriage of Einhorn, 178 111. App. 3d 212, 
533 NeE.2d 29, 35-37 (1988):6 In re Marriage of Lovetinskv, 
418 N.W.2d 88, 90 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Wassif v. Wassif, 77 
Md. App. 750, 551 A.2d 935, 939-40 (1989); Fudenberg v. 
Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. App. 1986); McKenzie v. 
Jahnke, 432 N.W.2d 556, 557 (N.D. 1988); Hughes v. Hughes, 35 
Ohio St. 3d 165, 518 N.E.2d 1213, 1214-16, cert, denied, 109 S. 
Ct. 124 (1988); Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449, 456-60 (W. Va. 
1987); Pergolski, 420 N.W.2d at 417. See also Jensen v. 
Jensen, 753 P.2d 342, 345 (Nev. 1988) (per curiam) (a custodial 
5. It is noteworthy that Congress, motivated by a desire to 
minimize administrative problems for the IRS, tailored its 
amendment to reflect a presumption that in the typical case, 
the custodial parent will indeed be the one providing most 
support. If it assumed the routine situation would be 
otherwise, Congress would have provided that the noncustodial 
parent would be entitled to the exemptions absent a declaration 
from the custodial parent. 
6. It appears that two divisions of the Illinois Court of 
Appeals have split on this issue. See In re Marriage of Emerv, 
179 111. App. 3d 744, 534 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (1989). The 
analysis in Einhorn is much more compelling. Einhorn carefully 
analyzes both sides of the issue. Emery, on the other hand, 
disposes of the issue in one conclusory paragraph, without even 
acknowledging the previously decided Einhorn opinion or the 
weight of authority to the contrary. Additionally, it is not 
clear that the trial court in Emerv had actually ordered the 
custodial parent to execute the necessary declaration. See 534 
N.E.2d at 1018. 
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parent can be ordered to execute a "waiver" of dependency 
exemption, but only if a similar result cannot be achieved by 
adjusting alimony and child support to achieve after-tax 
financial parity). 
We find Hughes, 518 N.E.2d at 1214-17, to be particularly 
compelling. In Hughes, the sole issue on appeal was identical 
to the major issue before us here. The majority considered at 
length the purpose for the 1984 amendment and concluded it was 
made for the administrative convenience of 
the Internal Revenue Service. A domestic 
relations court has broad discretion to 
determine the proper mix and allocation of 
marital assets and property rights in a 
divorce proceeding . . . . We find 
nothing in the legislative history of the 
[1984 amendment] to support [the] theory 
that new Section 152 was meant to encroach 
upon this exclusive statutory power of 
state courts. . . . The only concern of 
the IRS, evident from the history 
surrounding the changes, is that only one 
divorced spouse claim and receive the 
deduction. 
i 
Id. at 1215-16. In contrast, the Hughes dissenters argued that 
section 152 requires a voluntary waiver by the custodial 
parent, not one compelled by court order. J^ L. at 1217 (Wright, 
J., dissenting). Although one can only infer the basis for the 
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, 109 S. Ct. 124 (1988), it 
may be significant that section 152 is not couched in terms of 
a Hwaiver,M but only of a "declaration."7 
7. There are at least three reasons for the Supreme Court to 
have granted certiorari in Hughes if it felt the case was 
wrongly decided. First, the case exclusively involves the 
interpretation of federal law; second, a few state courts have 
adopted a different interpretation, one consistent with that 
espoused by the dissenters in Hughes, thus creating a split in 
authority; and third, the issue involves substantial policy 
questions and implicates the division of power under our 
federal scheme. 
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must consider which parent will receive this benefit in setting 
child support and alimony. At least three courts have even 
gone so far as to remand cases where the exemption was held on 
appeal to have been improperly awarded to the noncustodial 
parent# recommending that the trial court reduce the previously 
awarded child support and alimony in light of the noncustodial 
parent's loss of this financial benefit* See Lorenz, 419 
N.E.2d at 772; Sarver, 439 P.2d at 552; Davis, 707 S.W.2d at 
718. This result/ while unavoidable under the minority view, 
is bizarre, with dependent children the ultimate victims. As 
pointed out quite convincingly in £££££# 363 S.E.2d at 458-59/ 
the minority view forces state courts to achieve financial 
parity indirectly/ by downwardly adjusting otherwise 
appropriate alimony and child support/ rather than achieving 
parity directly# by sensibly allocating the exemptions. 
Second, these cases are lacking in thoughtful or 
disciplined analysis. For example/ the Florida Court of 
Appeals rejects Cross and its progeny because "deductions and 
exemptions . . . are not to be extended beyond the clear import 
of the language used." McKenzie, 532 So*2d at 100 n.3. 
However# as pointed out above/ section 152 merely grants the 
noncustodial parent the right to an exemption if he or she 
secures a declaration from the custodial parent. Section 152 
is absolutely silent as to whether or not state courts may 
direct the custodial parent to execute the declaration as part 
of its overall disposition. Thus# the McKenzie court offends 
the very theory it purports to uphold by imposing prohibitions 
on state courts which are not expressly or impliedly imposed by 
section 152. 
Similarly/ in Gleason, 728 P.2d at 967/ the Oregon Court of 
Appeals concludes/ without analysis, that w[i]n the 
circumstances here/ the court should not have designated which 
party would receive the dependency exemption.- Gleason 
obviously ignores the rationale of the more recent cases 
rejecting its conclusion, and in this light, its one-sentence, 
conclusory holding is not very compelling. Finally, we find 
Justice Neelyfs criticism of Davis, 707 S.W.2d 711, to be 
perceptive, as well as colorful. See Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 
458-60. Justice Neely concludes that "Davis v. Fair is an 
extremely formalistic opinion that strains at a gnat but 
swallows a camel.H 363 S.E.2d at 458. 
D. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
State divorce courts must always recognize the financial 
benefit accompanying dependency exemptions when awarding 
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alimony and child support. However, income tax exemptions are 
only valuable to persons with income, and up to a certain 
point# the higher the income the more valuable the financial 
benefit/ given the progressivity of the federal income tax. 
Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 460. Prohibiting state courts from 
allocating the available exemptions to the parent receiving the 
greatest economic benefit often results in the unnecessary 
depletion of limited family resources. 
Thus/ use of the power to order a custodial parent to 
execute a section 152 declaration should not be used to evenly 
or otherwise divide the available exemptions without regard to 
the particular economic realities. On the contrary/ it should 
be limited to those situations where the noncustodial parent 
has the higher income and provides the majority of support for 
the child or children whose exemption is claimed—support at a 
level which can be increased as a result of a reduction in his 
or her tax burdens. Indeed, it would be an abuse of discretion 
for a divorce court to order a custodial parent to sign the 
declaration in the absence of appropriately supported findings 
to that effect or demonstrating other exceptional circumstances 
making it in the best interest of the parties and their 
children that the declarations be signed. The declarations are 
not to be used as a kind of "consolation prize" for parents who 
are losing daily association with their children. Moreover/ by 
ordering the custodial parent to execute the declaration/ the 
court actually gives the custodial parent a tool to compel 
timely support payments. The court's order should provide that 
the duty to execute the declaration at the end of each year is 
contingent on the noncustodial parent being current in support 
payments. See also note 4, supra. The custodial parent may 
then rightfully refuse to execute the declaration if support 
payments are owing, thereby creating an economic incentive for 
the noncustodial parent to comply with his or her support 
obligations. 
As observed in Sarver, "[t]his is not a question . . . of 
•overrid[ing] federal tax law* or 'unconstitutional meddling 
with Congressional authority.' It is simply a matter of 
determining and preserving the most resources in situations of 
obvious limited resources." 439 N.W.2d at 554 (Sabers, J., 
specially concurring). 
E. CONCLUSION 
In summary, we conclude the 1984 amendment to section 152 
does not divest state courts of their traditional power to 
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allocate federal tax dependency exemptions/ and state courts 
have the power to order a custodial parent to execute a 
declaration in favor of the noncustodial parent. The contrary 
position followed by only a minority of jurisdictions was not 
intended by Congress, especially given the lack of an express 
termination of the traditional approach of state courts to 
dependency-exemption allocation. Finally, the practical effect 
of a contrary ruling would essentially prevent state courts 
from taking permissible advantage of progressive tax brackets 
and maximizing the resources available to support divorcing 
parents and their families. All of that having been said, the 
power to order execution of a section 152 declaration should be 
cautiously and prudently used, with the sole objective of 
maximizing the financial resources available to the ••family" 
unit. 
The court in this case had the requisite judicial power to 
direct plaintiff to execute the section 152 declaration for 
defendants benefit as an aspect of its overall property 
distribution. Whether or not that disposition was an 
appropriate exercise of discretion need not be decided in view 
of the extensive reassessment of property and support questions 
which will occur on remand. In the process of that 
reassessment, appropriate disposition of the tax exemptions, 
and the question of any related orders concerning execution of 
section 152 declarations, will depend on the economic realities 
which emerge and must be in accordance with the views expressed 
in this opinion. 
The parties shall bear their own costs and attorney fees 
incuri^ jfi on anpfiaJ. 
GregoTy K. Orme, Judge 
CONCUR: 
&)• 3U&H&4J 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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